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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates how the human error identification technique SHERPA can be 
applied to the task of administering drugs to hospital patients.  Human error 
identification techniques have been used in high-risk environments for some time.  
Drugs administration is a complex and risky process with many opportunities for error.  
The purpose of using SHERPA is to identify where in the process errors occur and to 
suggest the most suitable design solutions to mitigate these errors. 
 
Medical Error 
Improving the quality and safety of patient care has become an increasingly high 
priority in both UK and across the world (Department of Health, 2001).  Medical errors 
affect 850,000 people in the UK each year often leading to patients spending extended 
time in hospital or in community care.  These errors cost the NHS up to £2 billion in 
additional treatment and the cost of clinical negligence settlements is about  £400 
million (DOH, 2000).   
 
Medical error is also a significant cause of death in the United States.  The Harvard 
Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al, 1991) using data from 30,121 randomly selected 
patient records identified a total of 1278 adverse events.  From this figure it was 
estimated that adverse events occurred in 3.7% of hospitalisations and of these adverse 
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events 27.6% were due to negligence. (An adverse event is an actual or potential 
unintended injury resulting from any form of medical treatment rather than the disease 
process.)  For 70% of patients the adverse event led to slight or temporary disability.  
Disability was permanent in 7% of patients and in 13.6% of cases the outcome was 
fatal.  
 
Medication error 
Many of the major medical error studies have highlighted medication errors as a cause 
of adverse events suffered by patients (Bates et al, 1995; Leape et al, 1995; Brennan 
1991 Kohn et al, 1999).  Approximately a quarter of all claims to the Medical Defence 
Union relate to drugs.  Some of these claims may also be due to adverse drug events 
(ADEs).  An ADE is an injury caused by medications (Leape et al, 1995).  It may or 
may not be the result of error.  The Audit Commission Report, A Spoonful of Sugar 
(2001), reports that about 1200 deaths occur in the UK each year due to medication 
related problems.  Of these, 200 are the result of medication errors.   
 
Ferner and Aronson (2000) define a medication error as: “a failure in a drug treatment 
process that leads to or has the potential to lead to harm to the patient.“  The definition 
most commonly used is that given by the National Co-ordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) in the USA: 
 
"...any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm, while the medication is in the control 
of the healthcare professional, patient or consumer. Such events may 
be related to professional practice, healthcare products, procedures, 
and systems including: prescribing; order communication; product 
2 
labelling, packaging and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; 
distribution; administration; education; monitoring and use." 
 
American systems for monitoring medication errors are more systematic than those in 
the UK, though this is changing.  The United States Pharmacopeia (USP) in association 
with the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) has monitored medication errors 
since 1991.  Since 1998 the USP has collected information about medication error 
through MedMarx, an internet-based reporting system.  During 2000 a total of 41,296 
error reports were received of which 42% were errors in administering drugs (Figure 1).  
The other errors occurred during: prescribing (13%), transcribing (27%), dispensing 
(17%) and monitoring (1%).  Sixty three percent of the errors were not intercepted 
before they reached the patient and 3% of errors caused harm or a fatality. 
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Figure 1: Node where most errors have been reported (USP, 2000)  
A study by Philips et al (2001) examined 5366 medication error reports from across the 
world submitted between1993 and 1998.   Patients suffered serious outcomes in 68.2% 
of cases and 469 (9.8%) people died.  The most common types of errors resulting in 
patient death were:  
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Improper dose    
Wrong drug   
Wrong administration route 
Wrong strength  
40.9% 
16% 
9.5% 
5.7% 
 
The most common causes of error were deficits in performance and knowledge (44%) 
and errors in communication (15.8%).  
 
Causes of medication error  
Medication use is complex and is dependent on the successful interaction of health 
professionals functioning within different disciplines.  Errors can occur at any one of the 
five main stages of prescribing, documenting, dispensing or preparation, administering 
and monitoring.  Wolf (1993) has pointed out that nurses make medication errors 
regardless of their speciality and that errors occurred on medical and surgical floors, 
postpartum units, emergency units and medical and surgical intensive care units.   
 
The responsibility for the error is often placed on the nurse, as she or he is the last 
person in the drug administration chain.  A parallel can be drawn with aviation.  Pilots 
used to be held responsible for aviation accidents until analysis revealed other factors 
were highly significant.  The reality is that there are many different causes of 
medication errors and they often combine to cause the incident.  For instance, 
commonly reported reasons due to organisational factors are: workload, constant 
interruptions, shift patterns (Ferner, 1995); communication failures (Fiesta, 1998) and 
long working hours (DOH. 2000b).  Thornton et al (1999) cite lack of proficiency in 
calculation of drug doses, dilutions and rates of administration; incorrect preparation or 
compounding of drugs; inappropriate drug selection and using incorrect routes of 
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administration. Leape et al  (1995) in addition to the above, identified lack of 
information about the patient; rule violations (failure to follow accepted and well-
established procedures); slips and memory lapses in which the individual ‘knew better’ 
and could not explain why the error occurred and drug stock or delivery problems. 
 
The Drug administration Task 
In the UK many hospitals use a ward based pharmacy system and about 80% of 
medications administered are held as ward stock.  These drugs are the most frequently 
used and are stocked in bottles of 50 or 100 tablets or capsules.  Non-stock items are 
stored in a locked trolley.  Physicians use the patient’s chart to indicate to the nurse 
which medications the patient is to receive. This is kept with the patient and used to 
record drug administration.  The order includes the drug name, the dose and the drug 
administration round when it is to be administered.  Nurses make a drug administration 
round with a trolley four to six times daily depending on the ward.  Each dose is 
recorded on the medication chart, which usually allows 14 days of documentation.  This 
allows the patient’s most recent drug history to be viewed.  Pharmacists visit their 
designated wards daily to review all patient charts performing a clinical and supply 
function.  If a drug is ordered that is not held as ward stock, the pharmacist makes a note 
on the medication chart and a supply sufficient for several days is dispensed with the 
patient’s name on the container (Dean et al, 1995).  The other system that is 
increasingly used is the patient’s own drug system in which the patient continues to use 
medication they would normally use at home.  This is kept in a locker at the bedside. 
 
Giving medications to patients is a fundamental nursing role.  It is also a complex 
activity that carries a high risk of error, as the involvement of different health care 
professionals means that errors may occur at any stage of the process (Hand and Barber, 
5 
2000).  Nurses seek to give medications correctly or perfectly.  However their efforts 
are often confounded by poorly written prescriptions, constant interruptions, conflicting 
demands and high workloads. 
 
Addressing the problem 
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has been applied to drug administration as a 
process of continuous quality improvement and is usually carried out by an 
interdisciplinary group of healthcare professionals (Cohen, 1994).  A FMEA anticipates 
what errors can be made and what the results will be.  Thus for each medication the 
analyst will ask what will happen when someone mistakes a drug package for 
something else; uses the wrong amount of drug, gives the drug to the wrong patient, 
gives the drug by the wrong route, gives the wrong rate of a drug and so on.  The 
analyst then goes on to consider how best to prevent incorrect action being completed or 
to minimise their ability to cause an adverse event if they are completed. 
 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has set up a reporting and learning system 
for general and medication errors occurring in the UK.  It has also implemented the 
Root Cause Analysis system as a way of systematically identifying the factors affecting 
clinical error.  
 
Applying HTA to drug administration 
Many of the above studies have systematically analysed the context of drug 
administration.  However, there is still merit in analysing the process at task level to 
assess how best to reduce errors through design solutions.  Carrying out some form of 
human error analysis enables us to gain an understanding of how human interaction 
with drug administration tasks might lead to incidents.  A starting point might be to 
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explore the procedure for getting drugs to patients and then to examine the task steps, 
the equipment used and the relationships between these factors. 
 
Task analysis is a way of breaking the task down into its component parts.  It is also a 
useful way of looking at how people interact with equipment and with various aspects 
of their working environment.  Task analyses can be organised in a variety of ways and 
a commonly used format is to arrange information in a hierarchical form.   
 
A hierarchical task analysis (HTA) for the drug administration process is shown in the 
Appendix A.  The HTA was drawn up by the lead author who trained as a hospital 
pharmacy technician.  It was reviewed by two nurses, a hospital risk manager and two 
patient safety experts.   
 
The top-level goal of the system is to deliver drugs to the patient.  The task steps 
necessary to do this are listed as tasks 1 to 3 on the next level of the hierarchy.  Plan 0 
indicates the activities or sub-goals that should be carried out in order to achieve the 
goal.  These activities are further broken down into operations at the lower levels.  The 
order in which these are carried out is determined by the plan. 
 
SHERPA 
The Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) (Embrey 
1986) was originally developed for use in the nuclear industry.  It utilises a 
computerized question and answer structure to identify likely errors in the task analysis.  
The errors identified are based on the skill, rule, knowledge (SRK) model devised by 
Rasmussen et al (1981) and Reason’s (1987) generic error modelling system (GEMS).  
The approach attempts to link error reduction measures to underlying causes of human 
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error.   This human identification error technique allows the analyst to define the 
information that is useful for error reduction strategies.  It should be pointed out that 
experienced nurses are often able to recover their errors by correcting them before the 
patient suffers harm (Wolf et al, 1997; Baker, 1997). 
 
Error Predictions 
SHERPA uses the bottom level actions of the HTA as its inputs.  These are the 
operations or task steps carried out to achieve the higher-level goal.  The operations are 
evaluated for potential error using the human error taxonomy shown in Table 1.  The 
types of error that may occur fall into one of five behaviour categories: action, checking, 
retrieval, communication and selection.  Each error type in the taxonomy is coded and is 
associated with an error mode.   
 
The task steps from the HTA are examined in turn and classified into one of the error 
types.  The most likely error modes associated with that operation are considered.  For 
example, the task step 1.1.1 in the HTA “check patient bed” (Appendix A) is classified 
as a checking activity.  Looking at the associated checking error modes in Table 1, only 
the most credible errors for the task step are taken into account.  It is possible that whilst 
searching for a patient chart a nurse may fail to check the area around a patient’s bed or 
may be called away to attend to another patient and so not complete the search.  In 
nursing terms these are not strictly errors but within the SHERPA system these actions 
would prevent the goal of finding patient chart being achieved.   
 
The results of the SHERPA analysis are recorded in tabular form (Appendix B).  In the 
first column the number of the task step is listed (1.1.1).  The error mode C1 is entered 
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in the second column.  This denotes a check has been missed (Table 1).  In the third 
column headed “description” an outline of the error is entered.  In this case the  
Table 1: SHERPA Error Modes 
Error type  Code Error Mode 
Action Errors A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
A6 
A7 
A8 
A9 
A10 
Operation too long/short 
Operation mistimed 
Operation in wrong direction 
Operation too little/much 
Misalign 
Right operation on wrong object 
Wrong operation on right object 
Operation omitted 
Operation incomplete 
Wrong operation on wrong object 
 
Checking Errors C1  
C2  
C3 
C4  
C5  
C6 
Check omitted 
Check incomplete 
Right check on wrong object 
Wrong check on right object 
Check mistimed 
Wrong check on wrong object 
 
Retrieval Errors R1  
R2  
R3
 
Information not obtained 
Wrong information obtained 
Information retrieval incomplete 
Communication Errors I1 
I2  
I3 
Information not communicated 
Wrong information communicated 
Information communication incomplete 
 
Selection Errors S1  
S2 
Selection omitted 
Wrong selection made 
 
description would be “Fail to check patient bed area”.  At this stage of the analysis it is 
possible to make a prediction of what the consequence of that error might be.  The chart 
would remain mislaid and because the nurse had no record of what drugs were due to be 
taken or when, drug doses would be missed.  Thus, in the fourth column under the 
heading “consequences” a description of the potential consequence of the activity is 
entered.  The fifth column of the table (recovery) indicates whether or not the error can 
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be recovered.  It may be that by completing further task steps, the nurse will be able to 
go back and correct the original error or omission.  If this is the case that task step at  
which the original error may be recovered is entered in column 5 under the heading 
“Recovery”.  If it is not possible to recover the error then the “Recovery “ column is left 
blank. 
 
The probability of the error occurring and its criticality are denoted in the table by P and 
C respectively.  The probability of an error is categorised as low (hardly ever occurs), 
medium (has occurred once or twice) or high (occurs frequently).  Criticality (C) is 
usually all or none and it must be acknowledged that  many drug administration errors 
are potentially critical.  However the extent to which many administration errors cause a 
fatality or serious injury is highly variable and is dependent on numerous factors such as 
the drug’s potency and therapeutic range, the age of the patient (elderly or paediatric 
patients are more likely to be adversely affected); the condition of the patient, serum 
levels, the point in the administration chain the error occurred, the nurse’s knowledge of 
drugs or the nurse’s experience.  For the purposes of this assessment criticality will be 
modified to reflect three levels of severity: low (L), medium (M) and high (H).  The 
levels of severity correspond to the following descriptions  
 
L Level 0: No medication error 
Level 1: Error: occurred, no harm to the patient  
M Level 2: Error: increased need for monitoring, no change in vital sings 
Level 3: Error: increased: monitoring, transient change in vital signs, no harm to 
patient 
H Level 4: Error: increased monitoring, change in vital signs – treatment needed, 
change in length of stay or effect on an investigational drug protocol 
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Level 5: Error: increased monitoring and treatment, change in patient 
 Morbidity 
Level 7: Death 
 
(Modified from Demer and Moore, 1988) 
The incidences indicated as low in criticality are likely to be recoverable by an 
alternative course of action.  For example, being unable to find the keys to the drug 
trolley (2.3.1) could be overcome by ordering further supplies from the pharmacy.  But 
this course of action may not prevent doses being missed.  Putting a bottle back in the 
wrong place in a medicine store may cause the next person to select the wrong bottle 
from the shelf.  A misplaced bottle might contribute to an error but in this case reading 
the label offers the opportunity of recovery.  A more serious potential error would be to 
put the medicine bottle in an inappropriate place such as the IV fluids store or in the 
store for diagnostic tests.  Such an action would cause the medication to become mislaid 
and would again lead to drug doses being missed.   
 
In this generalised version of the model it is difficult to quantify criticality.  Dean and 
Barber (1999) have devised a more accurate method for scoring drug administration 
errors based on specific cases drawn from literature and scored by a cross section of 
health professionals.  The cases used refer to errors with specific drugs.  As this model 
makes no reference to specific drugs and takes no account of patient conditions it cannot 
make accurate estimates of criticality. 
 
Remedial design strategies 
The final column shows the measures that could be taken to reduce errors.  These are 
mainly in the form of design of products and technological systems.  It is important to 
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note that in order to be effectively implemented any design solution needs to regulated 
by appropriate management and organisational controls. 
 
Technology  
Radio frequency tagging was suggested as a solution to the problem of missing 
medication administration records.  It is also a useful system for the location of 
equipment.  Medication errors often stem from mistakes during prescribing because of 
slips in attention or because prescribers do not apply the relevant rules (Dean and et al, 
2002).  Prescription errors can be reduced by entering orders for medication into a 
computer system thereby solving the problems related to prescribing (bad handwriting, 
non-standard abbreviations, incomplete drug orders) and in particular errors related to 
compatibility of combined drugs or patient allergies.  This solution also resolves the 
problem of missing charts since the patient’s drug information is held in a data bank.  
Integrating computerised medication order entry with bar coding scanners also solves 
problems arising from reading the wrong drug name.   
 
Labelling 
Medical personnel often complain about the similarity of drug labels which makes it 
difficult to discriminate among products.  Pharmacy products dispensed for named 
patients have a small white label printed with the patient’s name, drug name, 
administration instructions and any warnings in a small black or grey font.  The result is 
that very often the bottles and labels all look similar.  Adding colourful or eye-catching 
features to the packaging or labelling would increase the nurse’s capability to 
distinguish products.  Increasing the conspicuity of product labels in this way should 
help to improve search strategies.  For instance, highlighting salient information such as 
drug name and dose would enable these features to be readily picked out.  This strategy 
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could also be extended to storage areas so that one class of drugs is not mistaken for 
another.  Using colour labels to distinguish categories of drugs is a common practice in 
anaesthesia. 
 
Equipment 
Selecting the wrong needle for a syringe assembly or the wrong tube for an IV set might 
be due to a genuine lack of knowledge or because of the large availability of items from 
which to select.  The NPSA has identified the latter problem in the case of infusion 
devices.  A pilot study revealed an average of 1,065 devices at the hospitals and an 
average of 31 differing types with 65% of these unused most of the time. (NPSA, 2004).  
Assessing usage and limiting the variety of equipment reduces the number of errors 
caused by selection are made and is a good way to force individuals to make the right 
choice.  This could be achieved by purchasing from a small number of suppliers, 
maintaining the same suppliers and procuring a small range of equipment in order to 
achieve some standardisation in available devices.  This would help agency nurses and 
those who work on several units who are often exposed to a confusing array of different 
devices.  Writing formal protocols for setting up and checking IV systems would be 
useful in addition to attaching simplified instructions to the device itself which could be 
seen when programming.  
 
Discussion 
The main purpose for carrying out this analysis was to demonstrate the types of error 
that occur during drug administration and where in the process these errors occur.  The 
analysis predicts what steps can be taken to achieve resolution and highlights those 
aspects of the drug administration process where design solutions would have the 
greatest impact.  
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 Many of the tasks presented in the HTA could be subdivided into further levels of 
component tasks and operations thus revealing a highly detailed description of the drug 
administration task.  The error mode taxonomy prompts the analyst to consider 
potentially unforeseen errors and the error reduction strategies are readily identified.  
The strength of the SHERPA technique is that it can be used to analyse tasks or 
processes at many different levels.  The technique could be adapted to different ward 
settings and could also be applied to a range of different health care procedures.  For 
instance, the method could be used to analyse equipment usage in order to highlight 
training requirements or to re-draft protocols as part of the quality review process.   
 
One disadvantage of using SHERPA as an error prediction tool is that a task analysis 
has to be drawn up before error predictions can be made.  In order to gain a full 
description of every step of the drug administration task, several long HTAs would be 
required.  Thus to obtain a high level of detail could be time-consuming, particularly in 
cases where no formal protocols exist.  Another weakness of SHERPA is that actions 
considered highly unlikely are excluded from the analysis.  An example of such 
exclusion occurs at step 3.3.2 of the HTA (“hang an infusion bag”) as part of setting up 
an IV infusion.  Failing to hang an IV bag would be considered by most nurses as an 
impossible error to make.  But if the situation arose where there was a shortage of 
infusion stands or the infusion bag had been removed from the stand whilst the patient 
was being moved, then this situation would not be so improbable.  However, failing to 
hang the IV bag due to a shortage of stands would constitute a systems error and thus 
this error mode should be included in the SHERPA analysis.   
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Kirwan (1992) compared SHERPA with 5 other human error identification techniques 
on the criteria of comprehensiveness, accuracy, consistency, theoretical validity, 
usefulness, resource usage and auditability/acceptability to see if the incidents predicted 
by the human error identification techniques matched those that had actually occurred.  
SHERPA performed well against the other techniques and achieved a high ranking by 
the analysts.  Stanton and Stevenage (1998) demonstrated that participants using 
SHERPA correctly predicted more errors and missed fewer errors than those using 
heuristics.  However they also wrongly predicted more errors.  When in a second study 
participants applied the SHERPA method to the task on three separate occasions there 
was little change in the numbers of hits and misses.  The frequency of false alarms fell 
over time producing an apparent increase in the number of correct rejections.    
 
The task analysis could be extended to take account of the activities occurring during 
the administration of controlled drugs, injections that have to be reconstituted or those 
whose dose has to be calculated according to the patient’s weight, of medications with 
particular emphasis on those that need to be reconstituted or those that need to be 
administered according to the patient’s weight.   The overall technique could be used to 
compare different systems of administering medication.  Validation of the errors 
predicted in the model need to be compared with data gathered by observation of  ‘real-
world’ drug administration.  This simplified model excludes the condition of the patient 
and the routine checks (blood pressure, temperature, kidney function) that are carried 
out on a regular basis.  The model would benefit from inclusion of patient states, as 
these have direct bearing on how nurses respond. 
 
Medication administration errors occur due to a number of varying and often interacting 
factors that may originate from organisational practices, the working environment or 
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personal and professional practices.  There is an underlying assumption that the 
SHERPA taxonomy is able to capture the full range of error producing activity whereas 
this is not the case.  Communication with patients and their relatives, colleagues and 
various departments all impinge on the process of drug administration.  These factors 
cannot be analysed effectively using the taxonomy and would require other techniques.   
 
Successful drug administration is dependent on an effective patient information or 
patient monitoring system.  Some drugs have a limited therapeutic range and various 
indicators (such as blood pressure, heart rate, anticoagulant levels) have to be checked 
before they can be administered in the appropriate quantities.  Medical staff also need to 
know which drug is needed and when.  This cannot be accurately ascertained in the 
absence of the medication chart.   
 
Solutions based on computerised technologies must be introduced only after carrying 
out a full and detailed analysis of all existing systems.  This is because of high cost of 
implementation, changes in working patterns and compatibility with other hospital 
departments.  Computer technology has been demonstrated to reduce medication errors 
however care should be taken to ensure that its use does not create latent errors 
elsewhere in the system.   
 
This paper illustrates how a human factors techniques can be applied to the process of 
administering drugs to hospitalised patients as a means of preventing error or reducing 
the effects of error.  Schnieder (2002) advocates the benefits of applying human factors 
to the issue of medication errors and makes the point that healthcare providers need to 
be more aware of the limits of human performance and that system changes need to be 
made to accommodate these limits.  Whilst this paper considers the actions of an 
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individual nurse in the process of administering drugs, the authors recognise that, as 
noted above, that drug administration errors are rarely entirely due to the actions of a 
single individual.  There is still an expectation of perfection among medical 
professionals at a time when risk is an accepted part of daily life in other fields of 
activity.  This is due to training and a number of other factors such as the culture of 
blame and the punitive measures that still exists in the NHS.  The blame culture is 
slowly changing largely due to several patient safety initiatives set up by the 
Department of Health and through the activities of the National Patient Safety Agency. 
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Drug Administration Hierarchical Task Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
Plan 1.1.1                      1.1.5  
               No              
                           
1.1.1 Chart    Yes  Exit              Exit     Yes    Chart         
 found?            found?    
      Yes Yes  
 No                                           1.1.4 
                      Chart No               Chart   No 
      1.1.2      found?        1.1.3     found?         
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 *  Pharmacuetical form eg plain, soluble or slow release tablets
1.2.2 
Read 
drug 
dose 
Plan 2: do 2.1 or 2.2 or 2.3 or 2.4 then 2.5 
Plan 2.4: do 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 then exit 
2.4.1 
Locate keys 
for controlled  
drug store 
2.4.2 
Unlock 
controlled  
drug store 
2.1 
Carry patient chart 
to drug trolley/ 
cupboard 
2.2 
Get medi-
cation from 
ward stock 
2.3 
Get medi-
cation from 
drug trolley  
2.4 
Get medication 
from controlled 
drug cupboard 
2.5 
Prepare 
medication (see 
sheet 3)
Plan 0: do 1, 2, 3, 4  in order 
0. 
3 
Administer drug to 
patient (see sheet 2) 
2 
Acquire medication 
1 
Check chart for 
medication details 
Plan 1: do 1.1 then 1.2 
1.2 
Read chart 
Plan 1.2: do 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.2.6  exit 
1.2.1 
Read 
drug  
name 
1.2.5 
Read 
drug  
route
1.2.3 
Read 
drug  
form* 
1.2.4 
Read 
drug 
strength
4 
Record dosage 
Plan 1: do 1.1 then 1.2 
1.1 
Find patient chart 
1.1.1 
Check 
patient 
bed 
1.1.5 
Start 
new 
chart
1.1.2 
Check 
nurse 
station  
1.1.4 
Ring other 
depart-
ments 
2.3.1 
Locate drug 
trolley keys 
2.3.3 
Take 
trolley to 
bedside 
2.3.4 
Unlock 
trolley 
Plan 2.3: do 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4  then exit 
2.3.2 
Locate 
drug 
trolley 
1.2.6 
Read 
start 
date
1.1.3 
Check 
doctor’s 
desk
Administer drug 
to patient 
Appendix A 
Plan 3.3:  do 3.3.1 to 3.3.8 then exit 
Plan 3.2: do 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 3.2.5 then exit
Plan 3.1: do 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4 or 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.7,3.1.8, 3.1.9 then exit 
3.1.1 
Take 
tablets to 
patient 
3.1.3 
Check 
patient ID 
wristband 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
             
              
   
 
              
 
 
 3.3.8 
Monitor flow 
periodically 
Plan 3.4: do 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6 or 3.4.7 or 3.4.8 according to chart then exit 
Plan 3: do 3.1 or 3.2 or 3.3 or 3.4 according to chart instructions
3 
Administer 
medication  
3.1 
Administer tablets 3.2 
Administer oral 
liquids 
3.3 
Administer 
IV infusions 
3.4 
Administer  
injections 
3.4.4 
Check volume of 
medication in 
syringe 
3.4.5 
Remove air 
from syringe 
 
3.4.2 
Check dose 
written on chart 
3.4.3 
Prepare patient
  
3.4.6 
Inject medication 
into vein 
 
3.4.7 
Inject medication 
into muscle 
3.4.8 
Inject medication 
subcutaneously 
3.2.4 
Present 
medication to  
patient 
3.2.5 
Observe patient taking 
medication 
3.2.2 
Check chart 
3.2.3 
Check patient  
ID wristband 
3.1.4 
Fill cup 
with 
water 
3.1.6 
Dissolve 
tablets in  
water 
3.1.7 
Present 
cup of 
water to 
patient 
3.1.9 
Remove 
both  
cups 
3.1.5 
Present 
tablets to 
patient
3.1.8 
Observe 
patient 
taking 
medication 
3.3.2 
Check chart 
3.3.3 
Hang infusion    
bag 
3.1.2 
Check 
chart      3.2.1 
Take medication 
to patient 
3.4.1 
Check patient  
ID wristband 
3.3.4 
Prepare 
patient 
3.3.5 
Attach tubing 
to cannula 
3.3.6 
Start 
infusion 
3.3.1 
Check patient  
ID wristband 
3.3.7 
Check flow from 
infusion bag 
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 2.5  Prepare 
medication    
 
Plan 2.5.2.2: do 2.5.2.2.1 -  2.5.2.2.7 in order then exit
Plan 2.5.1: do 2.5.1.1 to 2.5.1.6 in order then exit  Plan 2.5.2: do 2.5.2.1 in accordance with drug chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plan 2.5.2.1: do 2.5.2.1.1 to  2.5.2.1.8 in order then exit 
 
2.5.2 
Select 
medication 
Plan 2.5: do 2.5.1 then 2.5.2 
2.5.1 
Check patient chart 
2.5.2.2 
Select 
oral 
liquids 
2.5.2.3 
Select  
IV fluids 
2.5.2.4 
Select 
injection 
2.5.2.6 
Select others 
(topical 
preparations 
etc) 
2.5.2.1 
Select 
tablets 
2.5.2.1.1 
Take bottle 
out of store/ 
drug trolley 
2.5.2.1.4 
Open 
bottle 
2.5.2.1.2 
Read 
label 
2.5.2.1.5 
Count 
out dose 
2.5.2.1.8 
Put bottle 
back into 
store 
2.5.2.1.6 
Put dose 
in cup 
2.5.2.1.7 
Close 
bottle 
Plan 2.5.2.3: do 2.5.2.3.1 – 2.5.2.3.7 then exit 
Plan 2.5.2.4: do 2.5.2.4.1 – 2.5.2.4.7 then exit 
2.5.1.2 
Read 
drug  
dose  
2.5.1.3 
Read 
drug 
form 
2.5.1.4 
Read 
drug  
strength 
2.5.1.6 
Read 
start 
date 
2.5.1.5 
Read 
drug 
route 
2.5.1.1 
Read 
drug  
name 
2.5.2.3.7 
Prepare 
fluid 
bag 
2.5.2.2.1 
Take bottle 
out of store 
2.5.2.2.4 
Open 
bottle
2.5.2.2.2 
Read 
label 
2.5.2.2.5 
Measure 
out dose
2.5.2.2.6 
Close 
bottle
2.5.2.2.7 
Put bottle 
back into 
store 
2.5.2.2.3 
Check  
expiry 
date 
2.5.2.1.3 
Check 
expiry 
date 
2.5.2.3.1
Take IV 
bag out of 
store 
2.5.2.3.4 
Locate  
infusion 
pump 
2.5.2.3.5 
Assemble 
infusion 
pump 
2.5.2.3.6 
Prog-
ramme  
pump 
2.5.2.3.2 
Read 
label 
2.5.2.3.3 
Check  
expiry 
date 
2.5.2.4.6 
Break 
ampoule 
2.5.2.4.7 
Draw up 
injection 
solution 
2.5.2.4.1 
Find  
syringe  
and  
needle 
2.5.2.4.2
Take 
Injection 
ampoule 
out of 
store 
2.5.2.4.5 
Assemble 
needle and  
syringe 
2.5.2.4.3
Read 
label 
2.5.2.4.4 
Check  
expiry 
date
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SHERPA Output – Human Error Analysis Table 
 
Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
1.1.1 C1 Fail to check patient bed area Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.2 L M Tagging system for 
location of charts 
 C2 Carry out an in-complete 
check at patient bed 
Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.2 L M Tagging system for 
location of charts 
1.1.2 C1 Fail to check nurse station Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.3 M M A tagging system for 
location of charts 
 C2 Carry out an in-complete 
check of nurse station 
Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.3 M M Tagging system for 
location of charts 
1.1.3 C1 Fail to check doctor’s desk Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.4 M M A tagging system for 
location of charts 
 C2 Carry out incomplete check 
of doctor’s desk 
Chart not found - drug doses 
missed 
1.1.4 M M A tagging system for 
location of charts 
1.1.4 R2 Given false information 
about the chart location due 
to mix up in patient names 
Drug doses missed 1.1.5 L M System should track patient 
information through 
departments 
1.1.5 A6 Start new chart for wrong 
patient  
Drug doses missed or wrong 
treatment regime initiated 
 L M Formal chart reviews 
 A8 Fail to start new chart Doses missed leading to 
deterioration of patient 
condition  
 L L Local alert system for 
mislaid/lost charts or 
tagging system 
1.2.1 R2 Read drug name incorrectly Selection of wrong drug for 
administration 
Check before 
administering 
2.5.1.1 
H H Indicate the patient 
condition the drug is 
prescribed for 
1.2.2 R2 Read drug dose incorrectly Administration of overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
2.5.1.2 H H Only use standard 
abbreviations or write 
words in full.  
Computerised order entry. 
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Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
1.2.3 R1 Fail to read pharmaceutical 
drug form 
Administration of ineffective 
dose that could lead to an 
overdose 
2.5.1.3 M H Computerised order entry  
1.2.4 R1 Fail to read drug strength Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
2.5.1.4 M H Computerised order entry 
coupled with barcodes and 
scanning 
1.2.5 R1 Fail to read drug route Administer drug through the 
wrong route 
2.5.1.4 L M Write in full rather than use 
abbreviations 
1.2.6 
 
R1 Fail to read start date Give drug too early/late in 
treatment 
2.5.1.6 L L Highlight or write 
conspicuously 
2.1 A8 Fail to carry chart to drug 
trolley or drug storage area 
May forget drug name, dose, 
form, route  
None M L Take chart to drug 
store/trolley 
2.2 A6 Get wrong medication from 
ward stock 
Give wrong drug 2.5.1.1 H H Better labelling in storage 
area. Greater conspicuity 
of labels 
2.3.1 A9 Unable to find drug trolley 
keys 
Unable to open drug trolley 
doses omitted  
 M H Key keys in a designated 
area or have several sets of 
keys to given to  
designated staff 
2.3.2 A9 Fail to locate drug trolley Doses omitted  L H Keep trolley in designated 
place.  Tagging  
2.4.1 A9 Unable to find controlled 
drug cupboard keys 
Doses omitted  L H Keep trolley in designated 
place.  Tagging  
2.5.1.1 R2 Read drug name incorrectly Selection of wrong drug for 
administration 
2.5.2.1.2 
 
H H Indicate the patient 
condition the drug is 
prescribed for 
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Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
2.5.1.2 R2 Read drug dose incorrectly Administration of overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
2.5.2.1.4 H H Only use standard 
abbreviations or write 
words in full.  
Computerised order entry. 
2.5.1.3 R1 Fail to read drug form  Administration of ineffective 
dose that could lead to an 
overdose 
2.5.2.1.2 M H Computerised order entry  
2.5.1.4 R1 Fail to read drug strength  Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
3.1.2 M H Computerised order entry 
coupled with barcodes and 
scanning 
2.5.1.5 R1 Fail to read drug route Administer drug through the 
wrong route 
3.1.2 L M Write in full rather than use 
abbreviations 
2.5.1.6 R1 Fail to read start date Give drug too early/late in 
treatment 
3.1.2 L L Highlight or write 
conspicuously 
2.5.2.1.1 A6 Take wrong bottle out of 
store/drug trolley 
Give wrong drug 2.5.2.1.2 H H Smart labelling 
2.5.2.1.2 R1 Fail to read label Give wrong drug Immediate M M Make labels on packages 
more conspicuous  
 R2 Read label incorrectly Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
 M M More training about drugs. 
Colleague checks 
2.5.2.1.4 A7 Mis-count dose Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
Check control-
led drug book 
in the case of 
controlled 
drugs 
M H Colleague checks the dose 
2.5.2.1.6 A7 Put wrong dose in cup Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
 M L Have colleague check dose 
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Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
2.5.2.1.7 A7 Put bottle back in wrong 
place 
Wrong medication may be 
selected by the next person 
 M M Develop clear labelling 
system in storage area 
2.5.2.2.1 S2 Take wrong bottle out of 
store 
Administer an overdose or 
dose of no therapeutic value 
 L M Use colour coding  
2.5.2.2.2 R1 Fail to read label Wrong drug administered Immediate M M Make labels on packages 
more conspicuous 
 R2 Read label incorrectly Give wrong drug or dose  M M More training about drugs. 
Colleague checks 
2.5.2.2.4 A6 Use incorrect measure Give too much/little to patient 
resulting in over/under dose 
 L H Colleague checks what has 
been measured 
2.5.2.2.5 A7 Put bottle back in wrong 
place 
Wrong medication may be 
selected by the next person 
 M L Clearer labelling in storage 
area 
2.5.2.3.1 S2 Take wrong IV bag from 
store 
Give wrong drug  H H Clearer labelling in storage 
area 
2.5.2.3.2 R1 Fail to read label Give the wrong drug or wrong 
dose 
Immediate H H Make labels on packages 
more conspicuous 
 R2 Read label incorrectly Give the wrong drug or wrong 
dose 
 H H Make labels on packages 
more conspicuous 
2.5.2.3.4 A9 Unable to locate infusion 
pump 
Might select wrong equipment 
eg syringe driver 
 H H Keep pumps in a central 
storage area or equipment 
library 
 S1 Select wrong pump Give wrong dose  H H Have a guidance chart 
available. Reduce number 
of pumps to simplify 
selection 
2.5.2.3.5 A7 Assemble pump incorrectly Free flow of medication 
resulting in overdose 
 H H Training in infusion pump 
usage.  Reduce the number 
of different pumps used 
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Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
2.5.2.3.6 A7 Enter wrong programme Wrong or no dose delivered Immediate H H Redesign interface to 
simplify programming task 
2.5.2.3.5 A9 Programming incomplete Wrong or no dose delivered  H H Redesign interface to 
reduce the number of 
programming steps 
2.5.2.4.1 S2 Locate wrong sized syringe  Give wrong dose  H L Pre-filled syringes 
 
2.5.2.4.2 S2 Take wrong ampoule from 
store 
Give wrong drug or dose  H H Clearer labelling of storage 
area or smart labelling 
system 
2.5.2.4.3 R2 Read label incorrectly Give wrong drug or dose  H H Clearer labelling on 
ampoules or Smart label 
 R1 Fail to read label Give wrong drug or dose Immediate H H Clearer labelling on 
ampoules or smart label 
2.5.2.4.4 A7 Attach wrong needle to 
syringe 
Injure patient  L L Limit the selection of 
needles  
3.1.1 A7 Take wrong tablets to patient Wrong drug given  H H Barcoding 
 
 A6 Take tablets to wrong patient Wrong drug given 3.1.3 L H Barcoding 
 
3.1.2  Fail to check chart Wrong drug given  L H Barcoding 
3.1.3 C1 Fail to check patient ID Wrong drug given Immediate H H Barcoding 
 
3.1.4 A6 Present tablets to wrong 
patient 
Wrong drug given  M H Barcoding 
 
3.1.7 A8 Fail to observe patient taking 
medication 
Patient does not take 
medication 
Immediate H M Checklist 
 
3.2.1 A6 Take medication to the 
wrong patient 
Give patient receives the 
wrong drug  
3.2.2 L M Barcoding 
27 
Appendix B 
 
Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
3.2.3 C1/R1 Fail to check patient ID Wrong drug given Immediate H H Barcoding 
 A7 Present wrong medication to 
patient 
Wrong drug given  M M Barcoding 
3.2.4 A6 Present medication to wrong 
patient 
Wrong drug given  L M Barcoding 
3.2.5 A8 Fail to observe patient taking 
medication 
Patient does not take 
medication. 
Immediate H M Checklist 
3.3.1 R1 Fail to check patient ID Wrong drug given Immediate H H Barcoding 
 
3.3.3 A8 Fail to prepare patient Might introduce infection  L H Adopt  infection prevention 
procedures 
3.3.4 A7 Attach incorrect tubing to 
cannula 
Infusion flow may be 
obstructed 
 L H Tubing manufactured such 
that it can only be 
connected to specific 
items.  Limit choice of  
equipment. 
3.3.5 A8 Fail to start infusion No drug given Check flow M M Training. 
3.3.6 A8 Fail to check flow from 
infusion bag 
Over dose or no drug delivered  H H Formal checking system 
3.3.7 A9 Monitor flow infrequently Infusion tube becomes blocked  H H Formal checking system 
 
3.3.7 A8 Fail to monitor flow Patient receives the drug as a 
bolus resulting in an over dose 
 H H Formal checking system 
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Task  
Step 
Error 
Mode 
Description Consequence Recovery P C Remedial measures 
3.4.1 C1 Fail to check patient ID Wrong drug given Immediate H H System that requires 
varification of patient ID or  
barcoding 
 C3/R1 Check ID of wrong patient Wrong drug given Immediate H H Barcoding or wearable 
PDA 
3.4.2 C1 Fail to check dose written on 
chart 
Wrong dose given  M H Computerised order entry 
coupled with barcodes and 
scanning 
3.4.3 A8 Fail to prepare patient  
(swab skin) 
Infection introduced  L M Adopt  infection prevention 
procedures 
3.4.4 C1 Fail to check volume of 
medication in syringe 
Overdose given  L H Training in administering 
injections 
3.4.5 A8 Fail to remove air from 
syringe 
Air bubbles introduced into 
patient’s bloodstream causing 
death 
 L H Training in administering 
injections 
3.4.6 A3 Add to IV bag Administer by wrong route  M H Read instructions.  
Training to increase 
knowledge of medication 
 A3 Inject into muscle Administer by wrong route – 
could cause muscle damage 
 M H Read instructions. Training 
to increase knowledge of 
medication 
3.4.7 A3 Add to IV bag Administer by wrong route  M H Drugs added by pharmacy 
only 
 A3 Inject into vein Intravenous administration 
could be fatal 
 M H Read instructions. Training 
to increase knowledge of 
medication 
3.4.8 A3 Inject into vein Administer by wrong route  M H Read instructions. Training 
to increase knowledge of 
medication 
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